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2Introduction
According to the scientific literature on democratisation, democracy has enjoyed a remarkable 
degree of success in small and insular nations, with several island states having developed 
into stable  democracies,  even in  spite  of low levels  of economic  and social  development 
(Srebrnik 2004). In the final years of the 20th century, however, several coups d’état in former 
British colonies,  coupled with worsening conditions,  have drawn the attention of political 
scientists towards the pitfalls of small and insular democracies, revealing that ethnic tensions, 
in some cases, were more severe than previously assumed and that they could even be strong 
enough  to  topple  an  apparently  robust  set  of  Westminster-based  democratic  institutional 
arrangements (Fry 2000; Reilly 2000). The intent of this paper is to explain why some small  
island  states  have  stable,  functioning  democracies  whereas  in  some  cases,  democratic 
breakdown or erosion has ended decades of apparent democratic stability. 
The concrete question that is asked is as follows: what is the impact of consensual 
or majoritarian politics and institutions upon democratic stability in small and insular nations? 
In view of the relapse into less democratic forms of government caused by ethnic tensions and 
distributive conflicts, it is relevant to our understanding of size and democracy to question 
whether it is still the case that the small scale of democracy in small and insular nations is the 
main determinant for the stability of democracy, and to seek to understand how institutional 
design  in  an  environment  of  ethnic  diversity  and  distributive  conflict  has  influenced 
democratic stability in small island states. Furthermore, by studying this topic we can further 
specify the description Reilly (2000) gives of the “Africanisation” of small island states and 
assess its effects. The question is socially relevant as well, because in a way, its conclusions 
may be able to provide information about other small-scale democratic processes, such as 
decentralised governance in new democracies, which is often compared to small island states 
for the sake of its scale (Diamond 1999, 121).
In attempting to answer the question, this paper makes use of the comparative 
method.  The  author  conducted  a  four-case  small-N  comparative  study  based  on  the 
framework for institutional analysis provided by Lijphart’s (2000)  Patterns of Democracy.  
Among the sources used were the constitutions of the four nations, data on indicators of a 
number  of  variables,  such  as  disproportionality  or  cabinet  duration  and  evidence  of 
democratic practices as provided by the descriptions of other authors. The four cases were 
selected  from  among  ethnically  heterogenous  small  island  nations,  with  two  nations  – 
Mauritius and Trinidad and Tobago – enjoying continuing stability, and two others – Fiji and 
the Solomon Islands – in which democracy has eroded or broken down by coups d’état  or 
3other abuses. The method for the selection of cases will be elaborated below.
Theory, concepts and case selection
It is a well-documented and much-researched finding that democracy has enjoyed remarkably 
high degrees of success in small and insular nations (Srebrnik 2004). Several island states 
have  developed into  remarkably stable  democracies,  even some in spite  of  low levels  of 
economic  and  social  development  which  would,  under  normal  circumstances,  not  be  an 
environment conducive to the development of democracy (ibid.). Various attempts to explain 
this have been made in the scientific literature, but the most commonly found explanation is 
that in small island states the distance between politicians and citizens is smaller and that, 
especially  in  the  case  of  islands,  their  small  size  and  insularity  foster  a  homogeneity  of 
attitudes (Anckar 2002, 386-387). Through this attitudinal homogeneity, the social norms of 
behaviour  would  be  clearer  to  members  of  these  small  societies,  thus  leading  to 
cooperativeness and a willingness to accommodate different interests (Anckar 1999, 30).
Recent studies of small island states, especially in the Pacific, suggest flaws in the 
attitudinal  homogeneity  thesis.  According  to  Reilly  (2000,  262-263),  a  pattern  of 
“Africanisation” can be observed across the South Pacific in which the state is viewed more 
and more as a means of accruing wealth and exploiting resources such as minerals and land. 
The crucial observation here is that ethnic tensions combine with such distributive battles 
over control of resources, and lead to the instability of democratic institutions and even, in 
some cases, of the state itself (Reilly 2000, 262). This trend leads us to question whether  
attitudinal  homogeneity is  a  strong enough force to  explain  the prevalence  of  democracy 
among small island states, or whether such an attitudinal homogeneity exists in the first place. 
Either  the  homogeneity  of  attitudes  wasn’t  a  sufficient  condition  for  the  stability  of 
democracy, or there is some variable mediating between attitudinal homogeneity and small 
size.
Such a  mediating variable  might  be found in the  institutions  and the political 
system of  the  countries  in  question.  In  ethnically  diverse  nations  of  small  size,  the  way 
politics  is  conducted  might  be  expected  to  have  a  large  influence  on  the  stability  of 
democracy. An adversarial style of politics can easily be constructed to be detrimental to the 
stability of a small,  ethnically-diverse democracy,  as the party system will  most likely be 
based on an ethnic and/or regional cleavage, leading to centrifugal forces in society. On the 
other hand, a consensual system, combined with the small distance between electorate and 
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of the game in a broader sense, and therefore to democratic stability.
In  line  with  the  categorisation  above  of  institutions  into  “consensual”  and 
“adversarial”  categories,  this  paper  will  consider  institutional  setup  and  political  practice 
primarily  in  a  Lijphartian  sense.  In  his  influential  work  Patterns  of  Democracy,  Lijphart 
(1999, 7) presents democratic institutions on a continuum, ranging from consensus democracy 
on the one end to majoritarian democracy on the other. Although the scale is made up of 
several  separate  institutional  components,  consensus  systems  tend  to  divide  power 
horizontally and vertically among separate actors, striving for consensus, while majoritarian 
systems, exemplified by the Westminster model of politics, centralises power in the executive, 
which also controls Parliament (ibid.).
In  addition  to  this  broad  distinction,  Lijphart  (1999,  3)  conceptualises  two 
separate components of the consensual-majoritarian scale: the  executives-parties dimension,  
which concerns  the  arrangement  of  executive  power,  the  party and electoral  systems and 
interest  groups,  and  the  federal-unitary  dimension,  which  concerns  both  vertical  and 
horizontal division of power, with component variables such as constitutional rigidity and the 
degree and strength of bicameralism. While an argument can be made to include central banks 
in this second dimension, as Lijphart does, the prevalence of central bank independence in 
both Westminster and consensual system as well as its different focus – monetary or economic 
rather than political – from the other variables, means that it is not useful in our analysis of 
political institutions, which should concern the general characteristics of politics rather than 
of specific policy fields, no matter how important they are.
In this paper, it has been decided to use all the variables of the executives-parties 
dimension,  except  for  the  interest  group  system.  The  primary  reason  for  this  is  that 
information on the last aspect of the executives-parties dimension, the interest group system, 
might be difficult to obtain for small island states and that therefore, inclusion would not be 
feasible with the time and resources available. In addition, there are conceptual problems with 
the variable: it has been argued by Roller (2005, 112) that because of the inclusion of the 
interests of groups in a corporatist system would improve policy performance, the variable 
can pollute the executives-parties dimension with influence from the dependent variable. Of 
the five variables on the federal-unitary dimension, the central bank independence variable 
will be excluded for the same reasons outlined above, as well as practical reasons derived 
from limited time and resources. The rest of the variables will be used, although because of 
the small size of the countries studied, there is of course a limit on how far decentralisation 
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well be that its usefulness is limited for this reason. Nevertheless, I have chosen not to omit  
the  variable  because  of  the  important  role  devolution  arrangements  can  play  in 
accommodating ethnic and social diversity.
A central problem with this purely institutional perspective on political systems is 
that the institutions may not fully represent political practice in a democracy. The four cases 
used in this case study are all former British colonies, and their institutions therefore closely 
resemble  the  Westminster  system despite  some institutional  differences.  Nevertheless,  the 
democratic and political system can be expected to differ across the various nations in ways 
beyond those included in a purely institutional analysis, and it would be worthwhile to be 
wary of taking too much of an institutional perspective.
The same point  is  made by van Cranenburgh (2006)  in  her  discussion of  the 
practical application of Lijphart’s theory to the case of Namibia. She argues that though the 
institutions in post-independence Namibia appear consensual, the behaviour of political actors 
resembles the majoritarian model, particularly through the dominance of the ruling SWAPO 
Party  (Van  Cranenburgh  2006,  595).  She  concludes  that  in  some  African  cases,  the  ten 
variables proposed by Lijphart cannot be used to adequately investigate the institutional setup 
of new democracies (Van Cranenburgh 2006, 599). Although her argument primarily concerns 
one-party dominance in new democracies, van Cranenburgh’s contribution is useful because it 
reminds us of the importance of elite behaviour that was prevalent in Lijphart’s earlier work 
on consociational  democracy.  In light  of the similarities  we can expect  between our four 
former  British  colonies  in  terms  of  institutions,  this  behavioural  focus  is  a  necessary 
adjustment we will have to make to the Lijphartian model.
The relationship between the various variables used in this research proposal is as 
shown  in  figure  1  below.  The  variables  described  above  –  political  institutions  and 
homogeneity of attitudes– act as independent variables, whereas democratic stability or its 
opposites, democratic erosion or breakdown, act as the dependent variables. As argued above, 
I will primarily focus on whether the political system is consensual or adversarial. I expect 
that when conflict flares up, consensus-based political systems will be better-placed to contain 
it, thereby fostering a homogeneity of attitudes which will maintain or perhaps even enhance 
democratic stability in the manner proposed by the homogeneity of attitudes thesis. However, 
where the political system is primarily adversarial, the expectation is that conflict will lead to 
increased ethnic or class divisions, eventually leading to democratic decay. 
Despite the fact that there might also be differences depending on the level of 
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ethnically heterogeneous societies, in order to ensure the comparability of the cases and the 
feasibility of the study. In addition to the cases of Fiji and the Solomon Islands – two Pacific 
islands where a coup signified a case of democratic breakdown -, I have chosen two islands 
where democracy seems stable: Mauritius, seen by Leftwich (2000, 180-181) as the primary 
example of a democratic developmental state combining consensus democracy with a strong 
focus on economic development; and Trinidad and Tobago, which experienced instability in 
the 1980s and the early 2000s but maintained its democracy afterwards. While regional effects 
might  distort  the  findings  of  the  research  project,  with  the  two  examples  of  democratic 
erosion being located in the Pacific and the other two in Africa and the Caribbean, the cases 
are  otherwise  comparable.  In  addition,  all  are  former  British  colonies,  adding  to  the 
practicality of the study by staying within the constraints of my knowledge of languages.
Results
The theory as conceptualised above will be applied to the cases on  a variable-by-variable 
basis, considering each nation in turn for each of the variables so as to compare the four 
nations in terms of the consensualism or majoritarianism of their political systems. On each 
variable, the institutional characteristics of each of the cases will be described. In addition to 
this  qualitative  description,  additional  quantitative  data  may  be  used  such  as  indicators 
developed by Lijphart (2000) or the Rose (2000, 357) index of proportionality.
Democratic Stability, 
Erosion or 
Breakdown
Political 
Institutions
Consensual/
Adversarial
Attitudes
Homogenous/
Heterogenous
Figure 1: Relationship between the variables
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Before we start describing the political systems of the four nations, we must first bring into 
focus the difference between the four cases with respect to the dependent variable and paint a 
general picture of the way in which democracies have been stable or not. The cases were 
selected because they were different in terms of democratic stability: in selecting the cases, it 
was assumed that Fiji and the Solomon Islands represented democratic erosion or breakdown, 
whereas the selected cases of Mauritius and Trinidad and Tobago represented examples of 
democratic stability.
All four nations have known challenges to democratic governance and democratic 
values over the years of their independent existence. In Mauritius, this took the form of a state 
of emergency following the emergence of the Mauritian Militant Movement and the challenge 
it posed to the existing order by advocating strikes and disorder (Bräutigam 1997, 50). In 
Trinidad and Tobago, this  took the form of instability through the 1980s and a brief rule 
without Parliament between 2001 and 2002 (Ghany 2006, 95). In both Fiji and the Solomon 
Islands, the history of democratic breakdown and erosion is more extensive, occurring mostly 
in the 90s (Fry 2000). The two groups differ in the most important respect that both Trinidad 
and Tobago and Mauritius seem to have made it through those crises of legitimacy with their 
democracy intact, whereas instability was prolonged in Fiji and the Solomon Islands after the 
coups which suspended democratic functions.
This is borne out by the Freedom House (2012) indicators. In publications making 
use of these scores, countries classified as “Free” are usually seen as democracies or even 
liberal democracies, whereas “Partly Free” or “Not Free” indicates a degree of illiberalism or 
authoritarianism (Diamond 1999, 12). None of the four cases has an impeccable record of 
continuing scores in the “Free” range. Mauritius, relapsed into “Partly Free” during the period 
from 1978 to 1981, during which a state of emergency as a response to the MMM challenge 
was in effect (Bräutigam 1997, 50; Freedom House 2012). Trinidad and Tobago, too, relapsed 
into  being  “Partly  Free”  from  2001  through  2004,  possibly  because  the  Prime  Minister 
decided to rule without Parliament from 2001 to 2002 (Freedom House 2012; Ghany 2006, 
95). Both then returned to “Free” status (ibid.).
In contrast, Fiji and the Solomon Islands have not recovered from the challenges 
their new democracy faced in the form of the coups. Since 2000, the scores for the Solomon 
Islands rapidly degraded, so that at present, the country has scores of 4 and 3 on political and 
civil liberties, respectively (Freedom House 2012). In Fiji, the situation is even worse, with a 
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governance (ibid.).  The scores have declined since the  coup in  line with the expectations 
outlined  above.  There  is  therefore  a  difference  in  terms  of  democratic  stability  between 
Mauritius and Trinidad on the one hand and Fiji and the Solomon Islands on the other, with 
the former two being markedly more successful in addressing challenges to democracy.
1. Single-party majority cabinets versus broad multiparty coalitions
In Mauritius,  the constitutional  setup does  not  necessarily require  coalitions,  but  political 
practice  does.  Due  to  the  multiparty  nature  of  the  system,  government  in  Mauritius  is 
overwhelmingly consensual: only one party, the MMM, has ever succeeded in winning an 
overall majority of the seats (Bräutigam 1997, 53). Even in that case, a coalition government 
resulted  because  of  the  rules  for  the  registration  of  coalition  tickets  with  the  electoral 
commission (ibid.). Such an environment encourages contesting the elections in coalitions, or 
else the formation of a coalition cabinet afterwards. Mauritius, therefore, tends towards the 
consensual  end  of  this  variable,  because  all  of  its  cabinets  have  so  far  been  formed  in 
coalition. In addition, Bunwaree and Kasenally (2005, 18-19) note that the coalitions are often 
oversized,  leading to  a  skewed legislature dominated  by the executive,  thus  fulfilling  the 
definition given by Lijphart (2000, 2) of a consensual system as one where politicians search 
for large majorities, not necessarily minimum-winning majorities.
There is another characteristic of the coalition governments of Mauritius that is 
significant for our study of ethnically diverse small democracies. Due to the ethnic support 
bases of the parties and certain characteristics of the electoral system (which shall be touched 
upon under indicator 4 below), no ethnic majority has ever formed in the National Assembly, 
making the coalition not just multi-party but also multi-ethnic. This is significant because it 
forces coalitions to be more consensual and more considerate of the various ethnic groups on 
whom they depend for their support, thus making the system arguably even more consensual 
(Lijphart 2000, 33).
Trinidad and Tobago is an entirely different matter. Until the recent formation of 
the National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR), the nation had a two-party system in which 
the two main parties were ethnically based: the People’s National Movement had its Creole 
base,  whereas  the  United  National  Congress  and  its  predecessors  were  based  around the 
Indian population (Premdas and Ragoonath 1998, 34-35). As a consequence, almost all of the 
governments Trinidad has had since its independence have been single-party governments. 
Until the NAR won a landslide victory in 1986, government had even been dominated by the 
9PNM; afterwards, the PNM and the UNC have alternated in power while the NAR has been 
reduced  to  a  Tobagan  rump  and  has  since  disappeared  from  Parliament  entirely  (Inter-
Parliamentary Union 2002a; 2002b; 2010c).
Recently, Trinidadian elections have returned two hung parliaments: once in 1995 
and once in 2001. The first ended in a coalition between the UNC and the NAR (Premdas and 
Ragoonath 1998, 50).  The second ended in the appointment of the PNM leader as Prime 
Minister, a failure to elect a Speaker of the House of Representatives and thereafter a decision 
by the PM to rule without Parliament until 2002, possibly explaining the relapse in Freedom 
House figures from 2001 through 2004 (Ghany 2006, 95). In 2010, an electoral coalition led 
by the UNC secured a majority in the House of Representatives. Trinidad, therefore, tends 
more towards the majoritarian end of the scale, with single-party governments being the norm 
as under any Westminster system.
The case of Fiji is interesting because under its constitution as revised in 1997, 
Fiji forces multi-party coalition cabinets including every party with more than 10 per cent of 
the  seats  in  the  lower  house  of  the  legislature1.  However,  this  provision  was  never 
implemented under Prime Minister Qarase because of the exclusion of the Labour Party from 
the cabinet led by the Fijian Political Party (Lal 2002, 99-100). Overall, coalitions seem to be 
a relatively recent occurrence in Fijian politics: in keeping with its Westminster tradition, the 
nation only occasionally had coalition governments until the 1997 reform, only in 1994 and 
1987, with the 1987 coalition being an electoral coalition formed to defeat the ruling Alliance 
Party, which was immediately deposed by a coup d’état (Fry 2000, 297). Fiji can be classified 
as an originally majoritarian system which is gradually evolving towards a more consensual 
style of politics, although the political culture, as witnessed by Qarase’s refusal to appoint 
Labour Party ministers, still appears to be adversarial.
In  the  Solomon Islands,  judging whether  cabinets  are  single-party cabinets  or 
coalitions is not as straightforward as it seems because of the loose party system and large 
number of independents elected to Parliament: in the last two elections in 2006 and 2010, the 
independents  formed  the  single  largest  “grouping”  in  Parliament,  with  there  being  more 
independent  MPs than those  from any single  party affiliation  (National  Parliament  2012; 
Ogan 1999a, 1007). Independents regularly play a large role in electing the Prime Minister. 
Therefore, because of the loose party structure and many defections, it is hard to determine 
precisely who is and who is not in cabinet. The prevalence of independents and the fact that 
1  As per section 99 of the Constitution of Fiji 1997. http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/fj00000_.html (last 
accessed: 24th of May 2012)
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only  one  party  (the  People’s  Alliance  Party)  has  succeeded  in  getting  a  majority  makes 
coalitions a necessity, thereby placing the Solomon Islands in the consensual column despite 
the non-applicability of the party bases of coalitions (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1989).
2. Executive-legislative relations: dominance versus balance
In keeping with their Westminster traditions, all four countries have a parliamentary system in 
which the executive has to maintain the confidence of the legislature to remain in office. In 
addition,  most  also have a cabinet  system of government  in  which the Prime Minister  is 
technically first-among-equals. The lack of institutional differences in the formal relationship 
between Parliament and Cabinet makes it impossible to judge the dominance of the Cabinet in 
the  legislature  in  all  four  cases  relative  to  eachother  without  resorting  to  a  numerical 
indicator2.
Lijphart (2000, 129-135) uses the average duration of a cabinet government as an 
indicator for the dominance of the executive in the legislature. Even though it is difficult to 
operationalise in another manner, this indicator can be criticised because it relates more to the 
stability of a government than to its actual power, although the two are obviously related. I 
have  calculated  the  indices  in  the  same  way  as  Lijphart  (2000,  129-135)  did,  with  the 
exception of the Solomon Islands, where only the broader definition of cabinet change is used 
because the narrow definition, using only changes in party composition, would be ineffective 
given the loose party system. In addition, because of complications arising from the various 
coups or attempted coups in Fiji since independence, only democratically elected cabinets are 
included in the Fiji score, excluding those installed by coups or holding office ad interim.
The results reveal a range of degrees of cabinet dominance. Of all four cases, the 
Solomon Islands come in lowest with an average cabinet duration of only 2.4 over the course 
of 24 years. Furthermore, even if cabinet change were to be defined narrowly instead of the 
broad definition used in this case, I am led to believe that the figure would not be much lower 
given the many times a Prime Minister was replaced by Parliament (Larmour 2000, 149-150). 
Mauritius is second-lowest, averaging 3.9 in an average of the two scores, slightly higher than 
Lijphart’s (2000, 132) figure because of two stable 2000s Cabinets. Fiji has a slightly higher 
figure  of  4.5 years,  although the  necessary selections  in  the  data  might  have skewed the 
figure.  Most  telling  is  perhaps  Trinidad’s  score  of  6.7,  signifying  that  the  Westminster 
system’s  dominant  cabinets  have  been  taken  over  from  the  colonising  nation  after 
2  Integral data about cabinet composition was not available; the numerical indicator, therefore, is based on 
data pieced together from various articles detailing the political history of the four cases and may thus be 
somewhat unreliable.
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independence.  Judging by these  figures,  and in  line  with the  expectation that  multi-party 
coalitions deliver less dominant cabinets, the cabinets seem weak in all cases except Trinidad, 
making Trinidad more majoritarian than the other three cases.
3. Two-party versus multi-party systems
The operationalisation of the party system variable will be in accordance with the method 
used by Lijphart (2000, 65-67) for calculating the effective number of parties. Only those 
parties are counted which have potential for government participation or blackmail potential 
as a perpetual opposition party (ibid.). Up to a 2.5-party system, in which two main parties 
alternate in government,  occasionally joined by a smaller third party,  this  paper regards a 
system as a two-party system. If a system has more parties than that, it is regarded as a multi-
party system.
Calculating the effective number of parties for Mauritius was complicated by the 
fact that since elections are contested on an allied ticket – without a stable system of alliances 
-, most sources give the division of seats in Parliament among the alliances, with an effective 
number of “parties” that can be as low as 1.2 for 1982 and as high as 2.44 in 1976. It is, 
however, evidently not a two-party system, seeing as alliances among the parties are shifty 
and can change from one election to the next. To classify it as a two-party system would 
therefore be a fallacy, and for this reason I will use a qualitative analysis of the Mauritian 
party system instead of the quantitative indicator.
Mauritius has three major parties, thus qualifying as a multi-party system. Each of 
those parties primarily represents the interests of an ethnic group: the Labour Party primarily 
represents Indo-Mauritians,  the Mauritian Militant  Movement commands the support  of  a 
large share of muslims and Creoles and a significant minority of Indians, and the Mauritian 
Socialist Movement primarily represents Hindus (Bunwaree and Kasenally 2005, 10-11). In 
addition, there are several smaller parties, most prominently the Mauritian Social Democratic 
Party (PMSD), which used to appeal to Creoles but lost a large share of its votes following the 
creation of the MMM (ibid.). The Mauritian system is therefore clearly a multi-party system 
in which parties command clearly ethnic support, adding to its consensual value in terms of 
behaviour as well as institutions.
As mentioned earlier, Trinidad and Tobago has two major parties: the primarily 
Creole-based PNM and the primarily Indo-based UNC, which command a large share of the 
vote in constituencies dominated by their core ethnic group owing to a communal appeal in 
local campaigning that goes on despite inter-communal appearances in national campaigns 
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(Premdas  and  Ragoonath  1998,  36-37).  They  were  joined  for  some  time  by  the  inter-
communal  NAR,  which  started  strong  but  was  later  reduced  to  a  Tobagan  rump  and 
disappeared from Parliament altogether thereafter (ibid.). As described above, Trinidad and 
Tobago was dominated from independence by the PNM, which governed continuously since 
1986 (Premdas and Ragoonath 1998, 35). The system was therefore a dominant-party system 
at first – with a fully PNM Parliament in 1971 delivering an effective number of parties of 1 - 
and later developed into a two-party or 2.5-party system: since the PNM’s dominance was 
broken in the 90s, the effective number of parties has never been below 1.7, which is the most 
recent score. Like the Mauritian party system, the Trinidadian system has ethnically-based 
parties, but coupled with the “them or us” dynamics of a two-party system, this only enhances 
its adversarial nature because only one party, and thus one ethnic group, can rule at any one 
time. This puts the Trinidadian party system clearly into the majoritarian, adversarial two-
party column.
Like Trinidad and Tobago, Fiji has, for most of its existence, had two large parties 
which seem to be ethnically based (Ogan 1999b, 354). Since the 80s, this has taken the form 
of competition between the primarily Indo-based Fijian Labour Party (FLP) and the parties 
supported by the indigenous Fijian community,  the Fijian Political  Party (SVT) and since 
2006 the United Fiji Party. This is supported by the figures: since 1992, the effective number 
of parties is consistently above 3 and closer to the 3.5 threshold that Lijphart considers to be a 
sign of a multi-party system with a dominant party.
Even in the more recent coalition-based setup, rivalry between the FLP and the 
SVT seemed to have been fierce, with the two parties consistently being among the largest in 
Parliament, but never commanding a single-party majority. This rivalry is expressed in the 
refusal of the SVT Prime Minister to appoint ministers from the FLP despite the constitutional 
multi-party coalition requirements (Lal 2002, 99-100).  Despite this  two-party competition, 
Fiji’s  elections  are  not  two-horse  races  and therefore,  despite  their  two-party elements,  I 
consider  them to be a  consensual  multi-party system instead,  even though in practice the 
system still seems to be very adversarial.
The identification of the party system in the Solomon Islands as  two-party or 
multi-party is complicated by the fact that the nation’s political parties have historically been 
rather loose political alliances, with numerous defections and a large independent contingent 
in Parliament bearing witness to this fact (Ogan 1999a, 1007). It is clear that it is certainly no 
two-party system, seeing as the only single-party government collapsed rather soon and thus 
the alternation in power typical of a two-party system does not seem to be present in the  
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Solomon Islands (Larmour 2000, 150). It is difficult to call the Solomon Islands a multi-party 
system, though, because of the fluctuating party structures: nevertheless, one can argue that 
the party system is very consensual, as the large number of defections and independent MPs 
will undoubtedly necessitate cooperation between the parties instead of partisan competition.
4. Electoral systems: proportional versus disproportional.
As the four cases are all former colonies of Great-Britain, it is perhaps unsurprising to see 
many traits  of the Westminster system replicated in their  constitutions.  In the case of the 
electoral system, there also seems to be a  British colonial  heritage in  that all  four of the 
nations  under  study  elect  their  Parliaments  by  means  of  a  plurality  system.  There  are, 
however, differences influencing the proportionality and the consensual or adversarial nature 
of  the  elected  Parliaments.  The  degree  of  proportionality  of  electoral  outcomes  will  be 
quantified by means of the Rose (2000, 357) index of proportionality. The calculated Rose 
index values are shown in table 1 below.
Mauritius elects its National Assembly by means of a special modified plurality 
system with multi-member constituencies, with each constituency returning three members. In 
addition, a number of losing candidates, the precise quantity of which has varied over several 
versions of the electoral rules but is currently at a total of 8 seats, are awarded seats as “best 
losers” in  order  to  ensure  adequate community representation3.  This  means the  system is 
rather  disproportional:  it  has  an  average  Rose  index  score  of  79.4,  meaning  there  is  a 
considerable degree of disproportionality between the share of the votes a party obtains and 
its share of the seats.
Trinidad’s  general  elections  still  take  place  according  to  the  archetypal 
Westminster  formula:  members  are  elected  from  each  of  the  nation’s  36  single-member 
constituencies, with the plurality candidate being returned as the constituency’s member of 
parliament (Rose 2000). Strangely enough, when looking at the Rose index, the outcome of 
the system as seen in 1995 seems to be very proportional, with Rose indices as high as 97.8 in 
1995,  which  might  be  due  to  the  close  election  of  that  year,  which  resulted  in  a  hung 
parliament  because  of  the  close  results  in  the  five  marginal  constituencies  (Premdas  and 
Ragoonath  1998,  44;  Rose  2000).  The  average  Rose  index  value  of  87.0  indeed  makes 
Trinidad and Tobago the most proportional of all the four cases.
The Fijian electoral  system is  complicated  by a  division of  the  constituencies 
3  Schedule I, section 5 of the Constitution of Mauritius 1968 (as amended): 
http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/AssemblySite/menuitem.ee3d58b2c32c60451251701065c521ca/?
content_id=38c54555fc808010VgnVCM100000ca6a12acRCRD#first (last accessed 24th of May 2012)
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among ethnic groups, with 23 seats reserved for ethnic Fijians, 19 for Indians, 1 for Rotumans 
and 3 for members of other races, as well as 25 seats elected by all voters, although this 
number  has  changed over  time4.  Only members  of  the  ethnic  group to whom the  seat  is 
reserved may vote and stand for the reserved seats in the national assembly5.  One would 
expect such a system to deliver disproportional results, as ethnic Fijians are overrepresented. 
Nevertheless, disproportionality seems to fall in just below Trinidad at 86.9, although there 
seems to be a trend in which the system is becoming increasingly disproportional, with the 
1999 election having a Rose index of just 68.4.
Like  Trinidad,  the  Solomon  Islands  return  their  members  of  parliament  from 
single-member constituencies under a first past the post electoral system (Ogan 1999a, 1007). 
For some reason, Rose (2000) excludes the Solomon Islands from his list of electoral systems 
altogether. I have, however, calculated the index of proportionality, for which I have counted 
the independents as a party to account for their presence in the Solomon Islands political 
system. The average index score comes up at 65.6, putting it way below the other systems in  
terms of proportionality.
Except for the very high levels of disproportionality in the Solomon Islands, the 
results  in  terms  of  proportionality  are  remarkably close:  one  would have  expected  larger 
differences  in  the  cases  of  Mauritius  and  particularly  Fiji  given  their  special  ways  of 
allocating  seats.  Nevertheless,  differences  are  clearly visible:  despite  the  difference  being 
lower than expected, Mauritius still has a lower average Rose Index than Fiji and Trinidad and 
Tobago, and since the parity of representation between ethnic Fijians and Indo-Fijians was 
abolished in Fiji in the 1990 Constitution, Fijian electoral outcomes have become more and 
more disproportional (Hartman 2001, 649). Therefore, Fiji and Trinidad would be the more 
consensual of the four cases, moreso than the Solomon Islands and Mauritius, although all 
countries are located on the majoritarian side of the continuum because of using the plurality 
system.
Table 1: Rose Index of Disproportionality6
Fiji7 1972 1977 
(april)
1977 
(sept)
1982 1987 1992 1994 1999 Average
4  Section 51 of the Constitution of Fiji 1997: http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/fj00000_.html (last accessed 24th 
of May 2012)
5  Section 51 of the Constitution of Fiji 1997: http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/fj00000_.html (last accessed 24th 
of May 2012)
6  Rose (2000, 357) calculates this index as follows: the sum of the differences between each party’s share of 
the votes and share of the seats in a particular election is divided by two and subtracted from one hundred.
7  The calculations of the Rose index values for Fiji was based on data from Hartmann (2001, 657-666).
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Rose Index 92.4 95.1 82.5 96.8 93.2 86.6 80.0 68.4 86.9
Mauritius8 1967 1976 1982 1983 1987 1991 1995 2000 Average
Rose Index 93.7 88.0 72.5 85.0 86.2 69.9 70.8 69.3 79.4
Solomon 
Islands9
1980 1984 1989 1993 Average
Rose Index 65.4 77.3 47.2 72.4 65.6
Trinidad 
and 
Tobago10
1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1995 2000 2001 2002 Average
Rose 
Index
85.7 84.2 87.3 71.9 74.7 79.9 97.8 97.4 96.4 95.1 87.0
5. Federalism, decentralisation and centralisation
The Constitution of Mauritius does not make any provisions for local government, nor for any 
vertical division of powers in the sense of federalism. The only exception to this rule is the 
small island of Rodrigues, which is part of Mauritius (Meyers 1999, 728). However, even in 
the case of Rodrigues, provisions for the arrangement of government functions between the 
island and the central government are not enshrined in the constitution, but rather by act of 
parliament,  although  provision  is  also  made  in  section  75E  that  requires  the  Rodrigues 
Assembly to assent to changes made to its status and the Assembly can raise its own revenue 
if an act of parliament so provides11. Therefore, I do not agree with Lijphart’s (1999, 189) 
assessment  of  Mauritius  as  a  highly centralised unitary state,  as  devolutionary provisions 
constitute a moderate degree of decentralisation.
Like Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago has not enshrined the powers or even the 
8  The calculation of the Rose index values for Mauritius was based on electoral data archived by the Electoral 
Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa, obtained via 
http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/mauelectarchive.htm (last accessed: 18th of June 2012).
9  The calculation of the Rose indices for the Solomon Islands was complicated both by the extremely loose 
party system, in which it is not uncommon for newly-elected MPs to change party shortly after the election 
and the lack of percentages of the vote for the 1997 and 2001 elections (Steeves 2001, 800-801). The data 
used are taken from Steeves (2001, 803-804). In the calculation, the Independents were treated as a single 
party.
10  The calculation of the Rose index values for Trinidad and Tobago was based on data from Cáton (2005, 639-
642).
11  Section 75 of the Constitution of Mauritius 1968 (as in force at present): 
http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/AssemblySite/menuitem.ee3d58b2c32c60451251701065c521ca/?
content_id=4cb54555fc808010VgnVCM100000ca6a12acRCRD#rodass (last accessed: 24th of May 2012)
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existence of local government in its constitution12, which features the term only two times. 
Also like Mauritius, the smaller island in the nation, which has faced disparity in terms of 
wealth and power to its larger neighbour, has received some degree of self-governance in the 
form of  devolution  (Anderson 1999,  1114).  However,  this  devolution  arrangement  is  not 
constitutionally enshrined as it is in Mauritius, nor can the Tobago House of Assembly raise 
revenue on its own like its Rodrigues counterpart. Therefore, Trinidad and Tobago is slightly 
less  decentralised  than  Mauritius,  but  roughly  unchanged  from  Lijphart’s  (2000,  189) 
judgment of Trinidad and Tobago as a slightly decentralised state, which already included the 
existence of the Tobago House of Assembly.
Fiji,  too,  does  not  legislate  for  the  existence  and  responsibilities  of  local 
government in its constitution and is therefore not a federal state, although the existence of 
local authorities is assumed in the constitution as in both other cases13.  However, Fiji has 
historically had and still has an elaborate system of local and communal government, with the 
Great  Council  of  Chiefs  having particular  responsibility for  all  matters  relating  to  ethnic 
Fijians and a Council of Rotuma with greater responsibilities than normal local government 
governing  the  distinct  island  of  Rotuma  (Ogan  1999b,  353).  Fiji  is  therefore  more 
decentralised than Trinidad and Tobago but less so than Mauritius, although it has to be said 
that the responsibilities of the Great Council of Chiefs do confer upon the system a degree of 
asymmetry, as no group beyond indigenous Fijians has a similar mechanism.
Again,  like  the  other  three  cases,  the  Solomon  Islands  have  no  system  of 
decentralised governance enshrined within their constitution, although the constitution does 
seem to assume its existence14. Ogan (1999a, 1007) mentions that there has been continuous 
pressure on the Solomon Islands government to decentralise government functions because of 
geographic and linguistic fragmentation, leading to the establishment of provincial assemblies 
with a premier and a staff. By 1997, there were 9 provinces and 1 administrative subdivision 
constituting the capital,  Honiara (ibid.). The arrangement used to devolve powers to these 
provincial governments is similar to devolution, although the ordinances of the assemblies 
have to be approved by the responsible Cabinet Minister before they can take effect (ibid.). 
Therefore, the Solomon Islands have a slightly decentralised system of government, but I still 
classify them as majoritarian, as the devolution provisions have no constitutional basis and a 
Cabinet Minister at the national level has to approve every ordinance of the local assemblies.
12  Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago 1976 (with later amendments): 
http://www.ttparliament.org/documents/1048.pdf (last accessed 24th of May 2012)
13  Constitution of Fiji 1997: http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/fj00000_.html (last accessed 24th of May 2012)
14  Constitution of the Solomon Islands 1978: http://www.paclii.org/sb/legis/consol_act/c1978167/ (last 
accessed 24th of May 2012)
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6. Unicameralism versus bicameralism
Of the  four  countries  under  examination,  two have  unicameral  Parliaments:  the  Solomon 
Islands and Mauritius, respectively called the National Parliament and the National Assembly 
(Meyers 1999, 728; Ogan 1999a, 1007). The question of bicameralism is usually associated 
with the representation of the various subnational entities in a federal state (Lijphart 2000, 
203). Especially in Mauritius, where the National Assembly, as we have seen, is elected partly 
with the goal of at least symbolically representing all the communities by means of the “best 
losers” seats, this needn’t be the case, exactly: in such a case, even a unicameral parliament 
can be slightly consensual in nature because its composition divides power among different 
ethnic groups. Therefore, while both are extremely majoritarian because of the concentration 
of power in one house of Parliament, I consider Mauritius to be the more consensual of the 
two.
Both  Fiji  and Trinidad and Tobago have  similar  provisions  in  their  bicameral 
parliaments  as  regards  the power  of  the upper  house of  their  respective legislatures.  The 
arrangements mirror the traditional Westminster arrangements as seen in the United Kingdom, 
where the political primacy rests clearly with the lower house. Accordingly, both the Senate of 
Fiji and its Trinidadian counterpart need not pass money bills for the bills to be presented to 
the President for assent, and they may not present such bills1516. On other matters, the upper 
house in both nations has a suspensive veto:  although Fiji  has an extra requirement of 6 
months between the two passed bills in the House, in both nations the Senate can delay a bill  
for one parliamentary session, whereafter the House can choose to pass the bill again and 
present it to the President for assent17. Therefore, both nations are more consensually-oriented 
than the nations with a unicameral Parliament, with Fiji being more consensual.
7. Constitutional rigidity versus flexible constitutions
The standard requirement for amending the Mauritian constitution stands at  passage by a 
majority of at least two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly18. However, some 
15  Section 49 of the Constitution of Fiji 1997: http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/fj00000_.html (last accessed 24th 
of May 2012)
16  Section 63 and 64 of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago 1978: 
http://www.ttparliament.org/documents/1048.pdf (last accessed 24th of May 2012)
17  Section 65 of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago 1978 and section 47 of the Constitution of Fiji 1997 
(links given above)
18  Section 47 of the Constitution of Mauritius 1968: 
http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/AssemblySite/menuitem.ee3d58b2c32c60451251701065c521ca/?
content_id=4cb54555fc808010VgnVCM100000ca6a12acRCRD#assembly (last accessed 24th of May 2012)
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provisions  of  the  constitution  enjoy special  protection,  meaning that  the  requirements  for 
constitutional amendments are much more stringent than the general two-thirds requirement19. 
For a large number of sections, most of them pertaining to government institutions, and entire 
chapters pertaining to the judiciary, the constitution can only be amended by a vote of at least  
three-quarters of the National Assembly20. For sections 1 and 57(2), dealing with the name 
and  form of  the  state  and  the  parliamentary  term,  respectively,  an  even  more  stringent 
requirement is put, which seems to me almost impossible to meet: a three-quarters approval of 
the  population  in  a  referendum prior  to  the  introduction  into  the  Assembly,  followed by 
unanimous adoption by the Assembly21. This makes the constitution of Mauritius fairly rigid, 
especially in view of its complex, divided party system.
The Trinidadian Constitution is simpler to amend: while some sections pertaining 
to  the  government  institutions  are  protected  by  the  same  two-thirds  and  three-quarters 
provisions as their counterparts in Mauritius (with the Senate having to pass the bill by two-
thirds on all occasions to which the relevant sub-sections apply, even if the House has to vote 
three-quarters), the rest of the Constitution seems to be amendable by a simple majority22. 
This protects the Constitution’s major provisions against abuse by the government of the day, 
while  leaving  the  rest  of  it  rather  flexible.  Therefore,  the  Constitution  of  Trinidad  is 
considered  to  be  more  flexible  and  therefore,  more  majoritarian  than  its  Mauritian 
counterpart.
In Fiji, too, the Constitution can only be amended by a vote of at least two-thirds 
of the membership in both Houses of Parliament23. However, special conditions imposed upon 
the  passage  of  constitutional  amendments,  by  which  in  the  House  two-thirds  of  the 
representatives elected for each of the communities except for the Rotuman representative and 
in the Senate two-thirds of the members appointed by the Great Council of Chiefs have to 
vote in favour, giving them more influence24. Again, this provision is more stringent and thus 
19  Section 47 of the Constitution of Mauritius 1968: 
http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/AssemblySite/menuitem.ee3d58b2c32c60451251701065c521ca/?
content_id=4cb54555fc808010VgnVCM100000ca6a12acRCRD#assembly (last accessed 24th of May 2012)
20  Section 47 of the Constitution of Mauritius 1968: 
http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/AssemblySite/menuitem.ee3d58b2c32c60451251701065c521ca/?
content_id=4cb54555fc808010VgnVCM100000ca6a12acRCRD#assembly (last accessed 24th of May 2012)
21  Section 47 of the Constitution of Mauritius 1968: 
http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/AssemblySite/menuitem.ee3d58b2c32c60451251701065c521ca/?
content_id=4cb54555fc808010VgnVCM100000ca6a12acRCRD#assembly (last accessed 24th of May 2012)
22  Section 54 of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago 1978: 
http://www.ttparliament.org/documents/1048.pdf (last accessed 24th of May 2012)
23  Sections 191 and 192 of the Constitution of Fiji 1997: http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/fj00000_.html (last 
accessed 24th of May 2012)
24  Sections 191 and 192 of the Constitution of Fiji 1997: http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/fj00000_.html (last 
accessed 24th of May 2012)
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more consensual, although like the division of seats among communities, it is asymmetrical in 
that ethnic Fijians,  represented by their  reserved representatives and the Great Council  of 
Chiefs have two opportunities to veto constitutional amendments.
The Solomon Islands have a similar arrangement to Trinidad and Mauritius in that 
a  basic  requirement  of  a  two-thirds  majority  in  the  National  Parliament  is  codified  for 
constitutional amendments,  and that a number of sections are  protected25.  As in the other 
cases, these protected sections can only be amended by means of a three-quarters majority in 
lieu of a two-thirds majority and they mostly deal with the institutions of Parliament,  the 
Courts and the Auditor-General, as well as fundamental rights and freedoms26. Therefore, the 
Solomon Islands have a more rigid constitution than Trinidad but a less rigid constitution than 
Fiji or Mauritius, which require more stringent criteria to be met before certain constitutional 
amendments can be made.
8. Judicial review
As in the case of the rules governing constitutional amendments, the language used by the 
constitutions  of  the  four  countries  under  study is  roughly similar  to  each other  where  it 
pertains to judicial review. In all cases, the constitution is declared to be the supreme law, and 
all other laws invalid insofar to the extent that they contradict the constitution. Without any 
provision barring the courts from ruling on the constitutionality of legislation, this enables the 
court  systems  of  all  four  nations  to  review  passed  legislation  for  compliance  with  the 
constitution. The independence and assertiveness of the courts varies, but that information 
was hard to come by within the available time and resources, but the Mauritian High Court is 
mentioned  to  have  established  a  reputation  for  their  independence  in  reviewing  the 
constitutionality of legislation (Meyers 1999, 728).
Consensual or majoritarian?
All that remains now is for us to judge whether there is a clear enough difference between the 
two cases in which democracy broke down or eroded on the one hand and the two cases in 
which democracy remained stable on the other. This is, in some respects, made more difficult 
by the fact that the constitutions of the four cases are continuously evolving and reforming, 
and that the current constitutions (which were used for the analysis) may not have been in 
25  Section 61 of the Constitution of the Solomon Islands 1978: 
http://www.paclii.org/sb/legis/consol_act/c1978167/ (accessed 24th of May 2012)
26  Section 61 of the Constitution of the Solomon Islands 1978: 
http://www.paclii.org/sb/legis/consol_act/c1978167/ (accessed 24th of May 2012)
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force in this form at the time of the crises of democracy. Nevertheless, I believe I have charted 
the developments well enough to make this judgment. An overview of the results on all eight 
components is given in table 2 below.
The verdict on Mauritian politics is, perhaps, clearest. Ruled by coalition cabinets 
since its first democratic election, and having perhaps the most rigid constitution of all the 
three  cases,  the  Mauritian  success  story seems easy to  explain  in  terms  of  its  consensus 
institutions. We have seen earlier that, even in some areas where the institutions appear more 
majoritarian (following Lijphart’s classification) than their counterparts in Trinidad, Fiji or the 
Solomon Islands, the results of these institutional choices often involve more in a consensus 
direction. The primary example of this is the electoral system. Far from resulting in regular 
strong  majority  governments,  the  disproportional  electoral  system with  its  multi-member 
constituencies and “best losers” actually a rare case in which disproportionality works the 
other  way to  ensure  that  all  the  various  groups  are  adequately represented  and balanced 
against eachother.  The observation that Mauritius seems to exhibit  traits  of consociational 
democracy seems to  be well-grounded in  its  institutional  framework,  in  which  the  grand 
coalition is constructed by means of shifting alliances (Lijphart 1977, 32). There seems to be a 
homogeneity of attitudes in Mauritius in that the consensual elements of the constitution are 
valued by the  voters  even if  they are  only symbolic  in  the  current  situation:  people  and 
politicians alike seem to share an attitude that the consensual system of government prevents 
race riots and instability.
In Trinidad and Tobago, however, the institutional setup is puzzling, to say the 
least,  and it may even confound the hypothesis that majoritarian political  institutions may 
produce democratic breakdown. Far from being a consensual polity in which attempts are 
made to address institutionally the issue of a multi-ethnic society, Trinidad has an electoral 
system that produces regular majority governments, to the extent that for a long period since 
its independence, the country was ruled by a single dominant party, the PNM, which primarily 
represents the interests of the Creole population. With its one-party governments, relatively 
flexible constitution and recently-emerging two-party system, Trinidad seems to resemble the 
Westminster model much more closely than one would expect based on our hypothesis that 
consensus democracy contributes towards democratic stability.
What can explain this puzzling conclusion? Perhaps democracy in Trinidad and 
Tobago wasn’t as thoroughly consolidated as it at first seemed. The fact that the parties still  
make  communal  electoral  appeals  in  local  election  campaigns  despite  reconciliatory 
narratives on the national stage,  along with the fact that the most recent hung parliament 
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resulted  in  the  appointment  of  a  Prime  Minister  who,  in  peril  of  failing  to  obtain  the 
confidence of Parliament, prorogued Parliament until finally asking for its dissolution into 
2002, points towards the fact that democracy is not as stable as it seemed. This is borne out by 
the Freedom House (2012) indicators, which show a relapse from free to partly free as recent 
as the period from 2001 through 2004. Seen in this light, the seemingly counterintuitive fact 
that  Trinidad  has  a  majoritarian  set  of  institutions  can  possibly  be  reconciled  with  the 
hypothesis, although it still remains problematic given the fact that democracy seems to have 
recovered from 2004 onwards.
Fiji  is  another  case  where  the  results  do  not  seem to  fit  the  hypothesis  that 
consensual systems lead to democratic stability.  Despite having a multi-party system and, 
more recently, a mandatory multi-party government, making it appear to be one of the more 
consensual of the four cases, its democracy still remains unstable, with military coups and a 
refusal to carry out the constitutional multi-party cabinet requirement all occurring in the last 
decade, after the more consensual provisions were introduced in 1997.
However, the abuses seem to fit a pattern similar to the one that van Cranenburgh 
(2006) found in Namibia, where consensual institutions are overshadowed by an adversarial 
mindset. The asymmetrical provisions of the constitution, including the powers of the Great 
Council of Chiefs and the overrepresentation of indigenous Fijians in Parliament, seem to 
prejudice the system slightly in favour of this community. I believe, therefore, that it may not 
have  been  fully  coincidental  that  it  was  an  ethnic  Fijian  Prime  Minister  who refused to 
appoint Ministers from the predominantly Indian FLP to the Cabinet despite a constitutional 
requirement to do so. Bearing in mind that the 2000 coup by George Speight was also an 
expression of the fear of ethnic Fijians, their fear of losing their dominance may translate in 
adversarial practices, leading to instability (Fry 2000).
In the Solomon Islands, the only two aspects that are more consensual than the 
other cases are the extremely loose party system, necessitating coalitions and its very assertive 
Parliament. Still, on balance, I believe the Solomon Islands to be slightly more majoritarian 
than Fiji, and certainly more so than Mauritius, because of its electoral system, which is the 
same  as  the  Trinidadian  one.  Nevertheless,  the  Solomon Islands  are  closer  to  the  Fijian 
constitution and the Mauritian practice than to the majoritarianism of Trinidad and Tobago, 
and  should  therefore  be  seen  as  slightly  consensual.  This  need  not  cast  doubt  on  our 
hypothesis, however, seeing as the extremely loose party system could well be envisaged to 
result in instability, as evidenced by the low average Cabinet duration.
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Table 2: Overview of results on the 8 components
Component Mauritius Trinidad & 
Tobago
Fiji Solomon 
Islands
1. Single-party 
majority versus 
broad coalition
Broad coalition 
(consensual)
Predominantly 
single-party 
(majoritarian)
Forced broad 
coalition, 
though not in 
practice 
(slightly 
consensual)
Broad coalition 
(consensual)
2. Executive-
legislative 
relations
Balance
(consensual)
Dominant, long-
lived Cabinets 
(majoritarian)
Balance 
(slightly 
consensual)
Balance; very 
assertive 
Parliament
(consensual)
3. Effective 
number of 
parties
Multi-party, but 
elections are 
usually fought 
by two alliances. 
(consensual)
Two-party 
system 
(majoritarian)
Multi-party 
system 
(consensual)
Loose party 
system; lot of 
independents.
(very 
consensual)
4. Proportional 
versus 
disproportional 
electoral system
Plurality in 
MMCs with 
“best losers”, 
disproportional,
(majoritarian)
Plurality in 
SMCs, 
remarkably 
proportional 
(slightly 
majoritarian)
Plurality in 
MMCs, with 
communal seats, 
proportional
(slightly 
majoritarian)
Plurality in 
SMCs, very 
disproportional
(majoritarian)
5. Degree of 
decentralisation
Unitary, with 
Rodrigues 
devolution 
constitutionally 
protected.
(slightly 
consensual)
Unitary, with 
devolution to 
Tobago not 
constitutionally 
enshrined
(majoritarian)
Unitary, with 
devolution to 
Rotuma and role 
of Great Council 
in matters 
pertaining ethnic 
Fijians
(slightly 
majoritarian)
Unitary, with 
devolution to all 
provinces not 
constitutionally 
enshrined 
(majoritarian)
6. 
Unicameralism 
versus 
bicameralism
Unicameral but 
with effort for 
ethnic balance 
(slightly 
majoritarian)
Weak 
bicameralism 
with suspensive 
veto (slightly 
consensual)
Weak 
bicameralism 
with suspensive 
veto (slightly 
consensual)
Unicameral 
(majoritarian)
7. Rigid versus 
flexible 
constitutions
Fairly rigid 
(consensual)
Some protected 
sections, rest by 
simple majority 
(slightly 
majoritarian)
Fairly rigid 
(consensual)
Fairly rigid, but 
less so than Fiji 
and Mauritius.
(slightly 
consensual)
8. Judicial 
review 
Yes, High Court 
with assertive 
reputation 
(consensual)
Yes 
(consensual)
Yes 
(consensual)
Yes 
(consensual)
Overall rating Consensual Majoritarian Consensual Slightly 
Consensual
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Conclusion and Discussion
Do  consensual  political  systems,  therefore,  lead  to  democratic  stability  through  a 
homogeneity of attitudes? Yes and no. In Mauritius, it certainly seems to have been the case 
that the consensual setup of the institutions, which seems to be built to ensure power-sharing, 
has fostered a homogeneity of attitudes in that all citizens readily accept the authority of the 
government and the legitimacy of the democratic system, with communal violence being seen 
as the nightmarish alternative. The success story of Mauritius seems to fit very well into the 
Lijphartian framework by its consensual political system.
However, plausible as it may be in the Mauritian case that consensual institutions 
are  indeed  a  necessary  condition  for  the  stability  of  democracy  in  newly  democratic, 
ethnically diverse small island nations, it also appears that on its own, it does not appear to be 
sufficient. In the case of Fiji, we have seen another instance of van Cranenburgh’s (2006) 
“consensual  institutions  and  majoritarian  practices”,  albeit  in  another  manner.  While 
Namibia is majoritarian in its one-party dominance, Fiji is majoritarian in that one community 
is privileged over the others by asymmetrical constitutional provisions. That is a dangerous 
prospect for democracy, as we have seen in the regular occurrence of coups and irregularities 
in the past decade. While the letter of the constitution may be consensual, the ethnic Fijian 
government, it appear, chose to disregard it for some time, leading to tensions. The case of 
Fiji shows that without basic consensual practices or at least attitudes to accompany them, 
consensual institutions run the risk of becoming a dead letter.
Therefore, when consensual institutions are accompanied by consensual attitudes 
on the elite level, they indeed lead to a homogeneity of attitudes and democratic stability. We 
have to bear in mind, though, that this conclusion is based on only three cases, as we had 
good grounds to assume that there was another possible  explanation for instability in the 
Solomon Islands to be found in its loose party system. In addition, it was based only on the 
letter of the constitution and observations made by others. Further study might thus be needed 
to find further support for this relationship, as its external validity is limited. If, upon further 
study the case of Mauritius were found to be the only case supporting Lijphart’s theory, that 
would pose problems for the relationship found in this paper.
The attitudinal homogeneity thesis, this paper shows, may have to be modified: 
not attitudinal homogeneity on its own leads to democratic stability in all small island nations, 
but  rather  attitudinal  homogeneity  arising  from  political  circumstances  and  consensual 
politics. In addition, this paper adds further support to the findings made by van Cranenburgh 
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(2006) in the case of Namibia, revealing some of the problems with a purely institutional 
perspective like the one adopted by Lijphart (2000) in his  Patterns of Democracy.  We will 
have to look more carefully at attitudes at the elite level and political practices, in addition to 
institutions, if we are to draw any definite conclusions about a political system.
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